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PREFACE
The idea for this book was first developed in August 1996 in the 
course of a conference at the University of St. Andrews in Scot­
land which was organized by John E, Murdoch and William R. New­
man. This ten-day seminar ran under the same title as this book- 
“Late Medieval and Early Modern Corpuscular Matter Theories”-  
and brought together historians of science, philosophy and medicine 
from three continents.
The conference was sponsored by the Foundation for Intellectual 
History in London, founded and directed by Constance Blackwell, 
whose characteristic generosity made the meeting possible, who con­
tributed to its ongoing discussions, and who has in various ways en­
couraged the genesis of this volume. In addition, the Istituto e Museo 
di Storia della Scienza in Florence contributed financially to the con­
ference.
Although participating in the St. Andrews conference, Roger 
Ariew, Ugo Baldini, Saul Fisher, Guido Giglioni, and Fred Michael 
are not present with their own chapter in this volume. However, the 
contents of their presentations and their contributions to the general 
discussions have left clear traces in this book. Like Stefano Caroti, 
who could not be present at the conference, they also participated 
in the ensuing exchange of papers and thereby helped to shape the 
contents of certain chapters.
Above all we must thank Stephen Read, of the Department of 
Logic and Metaphysics at St. Andrews, not only for his presence and 
contributions to the meeting itself, but who, in the years preceding 
our conference planned and met with officers of his University in 
order that all arrangements for the meeting be assured of utmost suc­
cess. It is to him that our gratitude must be extended for receiving us 
with such efficiency and courtesy at St. Andrews. During the course 
of the conference, Chris Lindsay, now of the University of Glasgow 
as well as St. Andrews, was of assistance in more ways than we can 
number. Our appreciation must also go to Christine Gascoigne, who 
greatly facilitated the participants’ use of the library at St. Andrews. 
Lastly, we must thank June Pratt for her efforts in making it possi­
ble to hold the final banquet of our conference in the Edwardian 
mansionhouse Hill of Tarvit.
The actual production of this book would not have been possible 
without the help and assistance of Julian Deahl and Marcella Mulder
FRANCIS BACON AND ATOMISM: A REAPPRAISAL 
S il v i a  A. M a n z o
Francis B aco n ’s theory o f m atter is a controversial topic am ong his­
torians. D isagreem ent exists in particular about B aco n ’s atom ist and  
animistic ideas. R obert Kargon has m aintained that B acon  progres­
sively abandoned his early theory of atom ism  and replaced it with a 
contrasting pneum atic m atter theory. G raham  Rees has gone even 
further, claim ing that B acon  never m ade a positive com m itm ent to 
atom ism , which only played a m ethodological role, for exam ple in his 
invocation o f the D em ocritean m ethod o f dissecting nature to uncov­
er its subtleties. Rees also m aintains that B aco n ’s pneum atism  was the 
sole foundation o f his so-called semi-Paracelsian m atter theory. How­
ever, there also exists a very different viewpoint, which suggests that 
although B acon  changed his views on atom ism  repeatedly, he nev­
er rejected it com pletely (Partington, U rb ach ). Benedino Gem elli’s 
recently published im portant study seems to substantiate the latter 
view. By focusing on B aco n ’s relation to classical atom ism  and its 
sources, Gemelli is able to conclude that although B acon  rejected  
the vacuum , the atom  nevertheless represented for him  the smallest 
unit o f m atter, though it played no direct role in his experim entalist 
program.^
 ̂ All works are quoted according to the edition F. Bacon, The Works [Spedding 
e.a.], except for the English translations of De principiis, Descripiio, Phaenomena and 
De viis, which are quoted from F. Bacon, The Oxford Francis Bacon [Rees e.a.], and for 
the English translation of the E. Bacon, The New Organon [Jardine e.a.]. The short 
reference Letters and Life refers to F. Bacon, The Letters and Life [Spedding].
For the debate on Bacon’s atomism, cf. Kargon, Atomism in England, pp. 37-45; 
Rees, “Francis Bacon’s Semi-Paracelsian Cosmology,” pp. 81-101; Rees, “Atomism,” 
pp. 549-571; Urbach, Francis Bacon’s Philosophy of Science, pp. 72-79. Partington, A 
History of Chemistry, vol. ii, pp. 394-396; Gemelli, Aspetti, p. 195. Somewhat similar 
to Kargon’s are the positions of Lasswitz, Geschichte der Atomistik, vol. i, pp. 413-436 
and Hesse, “Francis Bacon,” pp. 236-247. Maccio, “A proposito dell’atomismo,” 
pp. 187-196, claims that Bacon’s abandonment of atomism is neither caused by his 
theory of forms nor by his pneumatic matter theory, but is due to his explanation of 
corpuscular motion by middle causes. Rossi, Francis Bacon [Gomez Lopez], pp. 194- 
197, 221-228, maintains that Bacon first adopted atomism and then rejected it, 
although he never thought it was incompatible with animistic views, and further 
suggests that Bacon was not convinced that science was able to find the principles of 
reality. Jardine, Francis Bacon, p. 114, speaks of Bacon’s indecision about atomism. 
Perez Ramos, Francis Bacon’s Idea, p. 102, n. 8, thinks that Bacon’s indecisive response 
to atomism is not important for our understanding of the “syntax” of his ontological
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I agree with this second interpretation, which I will substantiate 
by paying more attention to the usually neglected allegorical works 
and by investigating why Bacon changed his mind on atomism in 
his Novum organum. I shall reconstruct Bacon’s various opinions in 
chronological order to establish his final evaluation of atomism and 
his reasons for it. Given that Bacon never embraced a matter theory 
identical with Greek atomism, I shall here define atomism in the 
broadest sense, as a corpuscular matter theory that posits final and 
indivisible particles. Following this semantic delimitation, two succes­
sive Baconian opinions will be distinguished: the first took the atom 
to constitute an ontological and causative-operational principle; the 
second deprived the atom of this causative-operational ability, but 
did not touch its ontological priority. At the same time, I will in­
vestigate the question concerning the coexistence of atomism and 
pneumatism in Bacon’s theory, a point that has been discussed in 
the influential interpretations by Kargon and Rees. I shall argue that 
Bacon did not regard these two doctrines as incompatible.
I . A  Good Hypothesis
Bacon was one of the first major figures of early modern England 
who took ancient atomism seriously and who examined its utility for 
his new science. Like many others, he sought to replace Aristotelian 
natural philosophy, which he repeatedly rejected, with a philosophy 
composed of doctrines taken from both ancient and recent atomist 
sources. A  careful look at Bacon’s reaction to atomism can help us 
reconstruct the recovery of this doctrine in the period immediately 
preceding the Scientific Revolution. In addition to the undoubted 
influence of ancient sources, which Gemelli has traced with philo­
logical sophistication, we must also mention Bacon’s relationship 
with contemporary authors interested in atomist theories. There is 
evidence of Bacon’s acquaintance with members of the Northumber­
land Circle; we know that he had direct contact with William Lower, 
Harriot’s disciple and a friend of the Earl of Northumberland, whom 
he met in 1603,  ̂ and with William Percy, to whom he wrote a let-
positions. However, I think that the concept of form can be better understood if 
there is a clearer view of his matter theory.
 ̂ Letter of William Lower to Thomas Hariot (June 1610), quoted in Rigaud, 
Supplement, pp. 68-6g.
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ter in the same year celebrating Percy’s scientific interests.  ̂Harriot, 
Raleigh and the Earl of Northumberland are all mentioned in Ba­
con’s notebooks of 1608 and described as being worthy allies in the 
restoration of science.^ It is very probable that Bacon became aware 
of atomism through his contacts with the Northumberland Circle, 
since he first mentioned this doctrine precisely at the time he met 
Lower. Giordano Bruno might have been another important influ­
ence on him. Bruno spent time in England from 1583 to 1585 and 
was said to have inspired some members of the Northumberland cir­
cle with his atomist views. Although we find some traces of Bruno’s 
definition of Pythagorean atomism in Bacon’s work, there is no ev­
idence that he was directly acquainted with the atomist theories of 
the Italian.
Bacon’s interest in the atomist model is first manifested in his 
Cogitationes de natura rerum (ca. 1604), where atomism is considered 
a good hypothesis for explaining the subtlety of nature, being there­
fore “either true or useful for the demonstration.”  ̂At this stage. Ba­
con accepted atomism as a heuristic tool, independently of whether 
it was true or not, the important point being that it was a good hy­
pothesis. During this period Bacon was convinced that science had 
to search for the extremely small or “subtle” entities and motions 
hidden in nature.® Bacon’s complex idea of the nature of “subtlety,” 
which was important to him, was similar to Cardano’s.̂  For Cardano, 
“subtlety” operated on various levels: first of all, it was an intellectual 
process by which sensible things are perceived by the senses and in­
telligible things are perceived through the understanding, processes 
that are carried out not without difficulty. But “subtlety” also existed 
in the substances themselves, in their accidents and in representa­
tions (images, species, discourses, texts). In corporeal substances, it 
was associated with fineness, smallness of quantity, fluidity, and divis- *
* On Bacon and the Northumberland Circle, see Kargon, Atomism in England, 
pp. 43-44; Jacquot, “Harriot, Hill, Warner”; Gatti, “Giordano Bruno” and “Minimum 
and Maximum.”
F. Bacon, The Letters and Life [Spedding e.a.], vol. iii, p. 58 (1603); ibid.,vo\. iv, 
p. 63 (1608).
® Cogitationes, iii, p. 15: “Doctrina Democriti de atomis aut vera est, aut ad demon- 
strationem utiliter adhibetur.”
® Wolff, Francis Bacon, vol. i, p. 274.
 ̂ Cardano had been suggested as a possible influence on Bacon’s notion of 
subtlety by Rees, “Atomism,” p. 568. Bacon very probably read Cardano’s De subtilitate 
during his studies at Trinity College; he explicitly mentioned Cardano in Dignitate, 
I, p. 456 and Temporis partus masculus, in, p. 530; Partis Instaurationis Secundae, in, 
P -571-
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ibility; in incorporeal substances, it was related to God’s secrets and 
the order of the universe. For accidents externally caused, Cardano’s 
definition of subtlety was broad and included artificially constructed 
machines as well as acrostics, puzzles and mathematical problems. In 
such a classification, then, intellectual subtlety inevitably also turns 
into the subtlety of the object itself.®
Most of Cardano’s many meanings of “subtlety” can also be found 
in Bacon, who speaks of it as an objective attribute embracing all of 
nature,® found not only in material textures and schematisms, in 
motions and metaschematisms, but also in products of art such as 
clocks, which he says are as subtle as the works of nature. Indeed, 
Bacon also admires the greatest achievements of the liberal arts and 
sciences for their subtlety.̂ ® But for him, as for Cardano, subtlety 
means extreme smallness or imperceptibility (that is to say, invisibil­
ity and intangibility).^  ̂ The concept refers also to both tangible and 
pneumatic matter, as both are imperceptible at their corpuscular 
le ve l . In  the Novum organum, the so-called dissecting instances (also 
called “instances of Democritus”) are designed to remind the reader 
of the wonderful subtlety of nature: a little drop of ink spreads into 
many lines and letters; a little quantity of civet scents a much larger 
volume of air, etc.̂ ® Bacon showed particular fondness for the exam­
ple of the solution of saffron in water. He mentions this example 
several times, twice alone in the Cogitationes, where he introduces it 
when he declares for the first time his acceptance of atomism. Here 
the saffron-water solution is offered as an instance of the subtlety of 
nature, to which the atom is found to testify. The second time this 
example is invoked, it is used to furnish an analogy for the distribu­
tion of bodies in a vacuum. Bacon writes that tiny particles of saffron 
are distributed in a larger volume of water. Just as little empty spaces 
are distributed inside the matter of a body. He concludes that there
 ̂ Cardano, De subtilitate, pp. 1-2; Eamon, Science and the Secrets of Nature, pp. 279- 
281.
® Co t̂ationes: in, pp. 15-17; Novum organum, 1, pp. 154, 184, 306, 319; Historia 
vitae, 11, p. 197.
Ibid., 1, pp. 168, 191-192, 259, 266.
Ibid., I, p. 333; Valerius terminus, 111, p. 238; De viis, fol. 18''; Historia vitae, 11, 
pp. 195-196; Sylva sylvarum, 11, pp. 380-382; Novum organum, i, pp. 306-309, 318; 
Co t̂ationes, 111, p. 30.
Novum organum, i, p. 311. Rees’ interpretation that subdety meant pneumatic 
matter does not seem to be right, nor the inference that Bacon rejected atomism by 
accepting pneumatism in its stead. Rees, “Atomism,” p. 659.
Novum organum, i, pp. 319-320.
Gemelli, Aspetti, p. 144, n. 10.
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is no reason to deny that the same proportion of vacuum and body 
could exist at a cosmic level.*  ̂Later, in his Historia densi et rari (1623) ’ 
Bacon was to discuss this example in a very different framework. He 
now wrote that the dispersal of saffron. Just like other dissecting in­
stances, belonged to a kind of dilatation called per deacervationem}^ 
In such dilatations bodies whose parts have been agglomerated be­
come flattened through a change in the position of their particles 
{positura partium ). Because no change of volume is produced, but 
only a change in figure. Bacon speaks of pseudo-dilatations.^^ Cer­
tainly the processes of contraction and dilatation, which constitute 
the focus of Historia densi et rari, were central topics of the atomist 
worldview. Bacon’s attempt to explain the subdety of saffron as a case 
of pseudo-dilatation shows clearly the continuous thematic link with 
older atomist traditions and document his search for more adequate 
explanations than those provided by previous philosophers.
At the same time. Bacon attempted to give a scientific method­
ology that was as “subde” as possible, for he believed that “subtlety” 
was an intellectual attribute necessary for the competent natural 
philosopher. The subdety of nature. Bacon said, often exceeds the 
subdety of human understanding. The language and literary style of 
the scholastics had in fact been a typical case of vain subtlety.̂ ® How­
ever, Bacon was convinced that if our understanding were guided by 
the right method, many of the secrets of nature would become open 
to scientific investigation.*® But for this to happen, nature first had 
to be separated into subde parts in a process comparable to atomic 
dissection and alchemical anatomy: mundi dissectione atque anatomia 
diligentissima. The atomist inspiration behind this program is unde­
niable, and is in fact confirmed by Bacon’s enthusiastic acceptance 
of Democritus’ dissecting method, which he directly opposed to Aris­
totle’s method of abstraction.^® Democritus’ philosophy is frequently 
celebrated as the best approach to nature, and is compared with both
Cogitationes, iii, pp. 15, 17. Hero, mentioned by Bacon in this passage, had 
offered a similar example: the dispersion of a little quantity of wine in water. In order 
to explain this phenomenon, he argued that the empty parts inside the water were 
occupied by wine. Cf. Hero of Alexandria, Spiritualium liber, fol. B4''.
Historia densi, ii, p. 285.
Phaenomena, in, p. 707.
Novum organum, i,pp.  158, 160-16 i, 190, 215-216; Valerius terminus, in, p. 242.
*® Novum organum, i, p. 234.
2® Novum organum, 1, pp. 168-169; De principiis, in, pp. 83, 110; Interpretatio, in, 
p. 518. When characterising Democritus as a dissector of nature Bacon alludes to 
a pseudo-Democritean figure described in a second/third-century epistolary novel. 
See Rutten, Hippokrates im Gesprdch, pp. 55—63.
214 SILVIA A. MANZO
ancient and contemporary philosophies. In his theory of the Idols, 
for example, abstract generalization is opposed to the Democritean 
inquiry into the particular and concrete nature of things. Indeed, 
Bacon frequently associated the uncovering of nature’s subdety with 
Democritus’ strategy of dissection.^  ̂ This dissection of the physical 
world, so valuable for Bacon, is in turn linked to his examination 
of the forms, which he presented for the first time in the Novum 
organum in connection with Democritus’ method.^^
But Bacon’s notion of the anatomy of nature is also associated 
with the language of the alchemical tradition. In alchemy “anatomy” 
means more than the mere dissection of living beings as it does in 
medical anatomy; it sometimes refers not only to a separation of 
the physical parts of chemical substances, but also to the theoreti­
cal knowledge of the invisible forces involved. “Alchemical anatomy” 
means in this case the separation of the more general parts to gain 
access to the invisible virtues of nature. For example, Oswald Croll, 
a follower of Paracelsus, speaks of an anatomia mundi, which resem­
bles Bacon’s mundi dissections atque anatomia diligentissimaP Bacon’s 
anatomical method thus includes not only the anatomy of the physi­
cian, which distinguishes the visible components of organic bodies, 
but also an alchemical anatomy based on fire, heat and solvents, 
distillations and solutions. Particular attention goes to corpuscular 
anatomy, for if well guided, it can discover the homogeneous parts 
that constitute macroscopic bodies. But despite his iatrochemical 
beliefs. Bacon continues to warn that the subtlety of nature usually 
exceeds the perception of the anatomist. However, because the goal 
of science is to know not only the visible bodies, but also the invisible 
corpuscular bodies, iatrochemical anatomy must be complement­
ed by an inductive anatomy.^  ̂Anatomy, be it ocular, mechanical or 
chemical, must therefore always be guided by inductive reason which 
is able to develop a more general, comparative and axiomatic anato­
my. The final object and limit of this inductive anatomy are the 
simple natures, just as homogeneous bodies are the limits of medical 
anatomy and of laboratory distillations. Bacon speaks of this search 
in symbolic terms: the progress from a separation through fire to a
Rees, “Atomism,” pp. 567-571.
22 Novum organum, i, pp. 168-169.
Novum organum, i, pp. 218, 277. On Croll’s concept of anatomy see Hannaway, 
The Chemists and the Word, pp. 23-25. On anatomy in Paracelsus, see Pagel, Paracelsus, 
pp. 136-138 and Eamon, Science and the Secrets of Nature, pp. 157-158.
De viis, fol. 29''.
Novum organum, i, p. 234.
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separation through reason is called “from Vulcan to Minerva.”̂ ® He 
believed that chemists have failed to use “Vulcan” (fire) correctly, 
because they underestimated the utility of “Minerva” (reason), who 
should have been their guide and true instrument to separate the 
components of nature in experimental trials. ’̂
In keeping with this discussion of the subtlety of nature. Bacon 
distinguishes in his Cogitationes two meanings of “atom.” The atom is 
first conceived as the minimal portion of matter incapable of further 
division. This definition implies that matter is inwardly constituted 
in such a way that its subtle parts are imperceptible to the senses. 
However, their subtlety is not infinite, because matter is not divisible 
ad infinitum. The second definition of “atom,” in turn, presupposes 
the existence of a vacuum and describes the atom as something that 
is deprived of it.̂ ®
According to Bacon, Democritus’ analysis of the principles of na­
ture was better than his treatment of motion. Bacon tried to imagine 
the series of arguments that had led Democritus to his conclusions 
concerning atomic motion and assumed that the Abderite had be­
gun by asking what Bacon called a quaestio activa, namely, “whether 
all can be made from all.”^̂ As an affirmative answer seemed contrary 
to reason. Bacon supposed that Democritus had subsequently con­
cluded that all things had to come from heterogeneous atoms and 
that, as a result, he had formulated an ontological, speculative model 
to answer his ovm quaestio activa. By stating that atoms were distinct in 
virtue of their figures, sizes and positions, Democritus tacitly rejected 
Anaxagoras’ homoeomeriae and instead established the principle ex ni- 
hilo nihil.^ In Bacon’s judgement, Democritus’ question ignored the 
empirical facts, because it was unable to resolve (premere) the spec­
ulative question {quaestio speculativa) about the properties of atoms. 
For if we keep in mind the intermediate transformations that occur 
in bodies, the right question should have been “whether all things 
change through middle transitions and circles.” *̂ According to Ba­
con, it is not necessary to postulate that the ultimate parts of matter
Ibid.: “et transeundum plane a Vulcano ad Minervam.”
Advancement, in, p. 325; Dignitate, i, p. 489.
Cogitationes, in, pp. 16-18. Cf. Lucretius, De rerum natura, 1.510. Urbach, Francis 
Bacon’s Philosophy of Science, p. 73 is wrong when saying that Bacon Brst accepted this 
definition but later rejected it.
^  Cogitationes, w, p. 422; cf. in, p. 18: “utrum omnia ex omnibus fieri possint.”
^  Gemelli, Aspetti, p. 147.
Cogitationes, v, p. 422; cf. in, p. 18; “utrum etiam per debitos circuitos et muta- 
tiones medias universa non transeant.”
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must be diverse, because the variety of the bodies stems from the 
gradual transformations of the dispositions of equal material units.
Perhaps influenced by his current alchemical interests, Bacon 
took atoms to be equates et similares (Pythagoras’ view)̂  ̂ rather than 
diverse in figure, size and position (Democritus’ view). He seems to 
have thought of figure and size as limitations to the possibilities of 
transformation. Unequal atoms would impede the material continu­
ity necessary to obtain any property whatsoever from any body having 
the set of properties x . Democritus’ characterization rendered one 
type of atom capable of one type of transformation, and another 
type of atom capable of another type of transformation. On the oth­
er hand, if all atoms were identical, unlimited transformations would 
be possible through simple “numerical” or geometrical changes. One 
example of this is the transformation (i.e. total alteration) of wick 
into fume without any resulting residue.^  ̂In short, then, in his Cog- 
itationes, Bacon analyses Democritus’ account of motion from an al­
chemical point of view and finds fault with it. Democritus is accused 
of ignoring those facts of nature that show intermediary changes; of 
basing his theory of motion on false assumptions; and of deriving 
from these false premises the equally false doctrine that atoms are of 
unequal shape.
For Bacon, atoms are minimal particles, which combine into 
distinct figures and positions and operate in the interstitial vacua 
inside particular bodies. When taken in both these senses, the atom 
becomes useful as a precondition of the goals and normative rules 
of the new science; for it firsdy constitutes the ultimate particle un­
derlying all transmutations of bodies and secondly, as a fully replete 
body (without any internal vacuum), it represents the constancy of 
the material quantum  throughout processes of contraction, in which 
interstitial vacua are ejected from larger bodies without any matter 
having to be annihilated. At the same time. Bacon included in his the­
ory a very special kind of subtie and tenuous matter, namely spiritus, 
which he claimed deserved careful observation and manipulation by 
the natural philosopher.^  ̂ While Bacon did not search for an ulti­
mate cause of atomic motions, he did look for the conditions that
Cogitationes, ill, p. i8.
Giordano Bruno related atoms to numbers in a Pythagorean manner. See 
Gemelli, pp. 146-147.
Co t̂ationes, 111, pp. 18-19.
Later, in Historia densi, Bacon distinguished several kinds of pneumatic matter, 
spirits being only one of them. In an strict sense, “spirit” denotes the pneumatic 
matter which is locked up inside tangible bodies.
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were needed to explain changes, and he found them in pneumatic 
matter, equal atoms and interstitial vacua.
During that period. Bacon accepted the description of atoms 
associated with Democritus, i.e., that they were hard and coexisted 
in a vacuum, but he later questioned these aspects, though never 
consistently.^® From a methodological point of view, at first. Bacon 
thought that the search for natural extremes was a genuine goal for 
the new science and accepted the atom as a good hypothesis for 
his corpuscular matter theory, because it served as an ontological 
and causative-operational principle in a theory that required the 
existence of a vacuum.^’
2. Atomic vis and the Beginning of the World
The De sapientia veterum (1609) marks the beginning of a transition. 
Here Bacon becomes deeply interested in explaining causality and 
atomic motions. He now describes both atoms and spirits as masters 
(domini) of motions in mixed mechanistic-animistic explanations of 
various phenomena, which he discusses in the form of myths for 
which he omits all experimental data. The brief account of the myth 
of Cupid in De sapientia veterum focuses, for example, on atomic 
motion, with Cupid representing the natural motion of the atom. 
The atom is said to be an antiquissima et unica vis, which is found 
in all objects created from matter {ex materia). Bacon assumes the 
existence of interstitial vo£ua and concludes that this atomic virtue 
operates only at a distance. At the same time, atomic primary matter 
is described as possessing stimulus, appetitus and sympathia.^^
Bacon notes that the atomic motions (ascent and descent) de­
scribed by Democritus are insufficient, as there are many other kinds 
of motion.^  ̂ Without defining primitive atomic motion. Bacon de­
scribes the conditions for their existence through the image of Cupid 
Sagittarius. Action at a distance is an eminent case of the ubiquitous 
emanations found in nature. Thus according to Bacon, if we assume 
the existence of atoms and of a vacuum, then the atomic virtue nec-
Valerius terminus, ill, pp. 243, 227-228.
Temporispartus masculus, iii, p. 537. Wolff, Francis Bacon, vol. i, p. 274.
Sapientia, vi, p. 655.
Sapientia, vi, pp. 655-656; De principiis, iii, p. 82; Sylva sylvarum, ii, p. 346. 
Bacon mixed Democritus’ views on motion with these of the Epicurean Lucretius. 
On Democritus’ and Epicurus’ theories of motion, see Wolff, Francis Bacon, vol. i, 
pp. 260-262 and Pabst, Atomtheorien, pp. 8-13, 45-49.
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essarily acts at a distance. Bacon seems to assume that without action 
at a distance, all things would remain immovable in the vacuum,^° In 
the fable of Pan, included in the same work. Bacon affirms that all 
things emanate immaterial virtues as if they were rays (radii)
This idea is not unlike the vis radiativa of Walter Warner and 
Nicholas Hill.̂  ̂ In the 1620’s, Warner established that matter could 
not be moved by itself without an external agent which he took to 
be a virtue or vis radiativa}^ Warner believed that the nature of this 
force is not accessible to human knowledge. As it is interpenetrable, 
it can move matter in space and time. It can cause its effects ei­
ther by direct contact or by a medium, by gradual transitions."̂  ̂Like 
Bacon, Warner combines Neoplatonic and mechanical concepts to 
explain the phenomenon of visual perception. Color is nothing but 
the action of a vis on visual spirits which is reflected from the atom­
ic structure of the body. Perception is defined in terms of atomic 
structures and its cause as a motion of radiative energy^  ̂ In the same 
way, using Democritus and Epicurus as his authorities. Bacon defines 
the forms of colors as the corpuscular structure of macroscopic bod­
ies. However, he takes the emission of visible species to be radial, 
incorporeal, at a distance, and tenuous, and describes sense percep­
tion in terms of minute channels in the human body.̂ ® Nicholas Hill, 
whose Philosophia Epicurea, Democritiana, Theophrastica (1601) was the 
only English atomist work published before Bacon’s, describes the 
vis radiativa in religious terms, as an active, divine, and causative 
principle.
By the same token. Bacon’s objections to Epicurus’ doctrine of 
atomic motion are theological rather than physical.^  ̂ He finds the
Sapientia, vi, p. 656: “quisquis autem atomum asserit atque vacuum ..., neces- 
sario virtutem atomi ad distans introducit; neque enim hac dempta, aliquis motus 
(propter vacuum interpositum) excitari posset, sed omnia torperent et immobilia 
manerent.”
Sapientia, vi, p. 637; Dignitate, i, p. 525.
Cf. the chapter by Clucas in this book.
43 Warner, British Library, Add. m s s  4394, fols. 389, quoted in Kargon, Atomism in 
England, p. 37.
/^>id.;Jacquot, “Harriot, Hill, Warner,” pp. 117-119 .
On Warner’s natural philosophy see ibid., pp. 116-125; Kargon, Atomism in 
England, pp. 35-42; Henry, “Occult Qualities.”
Valerius terminus, in, pp. 236-239 and Rossi, ErancisBacon [Gomez Lopez], pp.
333-336-
This concept can also be found in Harriot’s manuscripts, albeit more sporadic 
than in Hill and Warner; cf. the chapter by Clucas in the present book.
Sapientia, vi, pp. 655-656; Meditationes, vii, p. 241.
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clinamen theory and the causal account of motion to be worthy only 
of mockery.̂ ® In his religious work, the Meditationes sacrae (1597),  
Bacon distinguishes between various types of heresy. In this context, 
he accuses Epicurus of swapping Democritus’ notion of “destiny” for 
his own “fortune,” thereby committing an error similar to that of the 
heretic who neglects the equilibrium between God’s power and God’s 
knowledge. Bacon’s Calvinist perspective does not allow for the view 
that God knows what is going to happen and yet does not predestine 
it. Seen in this light, the doctrine of atomic clinamen would seem 
to imply that God’s knowledge is stronger than his power. In short. 
Bacon accuses Epicureanism of ignoring the rigorous causal chain 
of nature which reflects God’s prescience.^®
It seems, then, that Bacon understands the fortuna  of atomic 
chance as the necessity imposed by divine providence. While Venus 
is said to represent a general procreative disposition, Cupid embod­
ies a specific sympathy towards the individual. With the action of a 
minimum of providence, the atom moves blindly towards whatever 
it feels attracted to. The point is that Bacon considers God’s prov­
idence to be admirably revealed when chance intervenes in these 
atomic appetites. He marvels at the notion that God makes use of 
a blind entity to obtain order and beauty. *̂ But that very blindness 
comes to symbolize the fact that atomic motions are deprived of final- 
ity.̂ 2 This is a similar concept to the wandering cause in the Timaeus, 
and in truth, Plato’s view of causality and necessity in the physical 
world have here been assimilated by Bacon.̂ ®
Bacon employs other mythological figures, for example the Par- 
cae, sisters of Pan, to designate the fates (fata) of individual things. 
This interpretation, which is briefly sketched in De sapientia veterum, 
is considered in greater detail in De dignitate et augmentis scientiarum 
(1623),^  ̂where Bacon compares the causal chain of actions for ev­
ery individual to the Parcae’s threads: both are hidden and difficult
Temporispartus masculus, in, p. 537; Sapientia, vi, p. 656; Dignitate, i, p. 571 (only 
here Bacon ascribes to Democritus the thesis of concursus fortuitus); Dignitate, i, p. 
634.
Meditationes, vii, p. 241; Dignitate, i, p. 524. Bacon repeats in essence the usual 
objections formulated by Patristic authors to Epicurus’ atomism. See Gemelli, Aspetti, 
pp. 20-24; Pabst, Atomtheorien, pp. 30-44.
Sapientia, vi, p. 656.
Rossi, Francis Bacon [Gomez Lopez], p. 195.
Wolff, Francis Bacon, vol. i, pp. 124-125; Plato, Timaeus, 48a. Dignitate, i, p. 550. 
On the Timaeic tradition in Bacon’s work, see Briggs, Francis Bacon.
Dignitate, i, p. 524; Sapientia, vi, p. 637.
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to know.̂  ̂However, there is nothing in the order of nature so small 
as to be without cause, nor again anything so great that it does not 
depend on something else according to a certa lex.
The distinction between individual and generic fate takes Bacon 
to the epistemological question concerning prediction, a topic com­
mented on briefly in the fable of Proteus, where Bacon claims that 
once a natural philosopher knows matter, he will be able to know 
all present, past, and future things. However, his knowledge will be 
limited to particular subjects {singularia) Obviously, this claim is 
not easily reconciled with the better-known assumptions of Bacon’s 
inductive method. Yet, natural history must start from individuals in 
space and time, given the existence of uniformity in each species. 
Bacon recognizes only two genera individuorum  as exceptions to this 
generic uniformity: first, those individuals that are unique in their 
species (such as the sun and the moon among the wandering stars); 
and secondly, those individuals that are so remote from the respec­
tive natures of their species that they are impossible to classify (mon­
sters) In short, the basic conception of his natural history assumes 
that there is a similarity among individuals of the same species, so that 
if their respective form is known, their motions will be predictable. 
In this point Bacon adopts a moderate determinist methodological 
program.®®
In Deprincipiis atque originibus, around 1612, Bacon offered a de­
tailed ontological description of the atom as it had functioned at the 
beginning of the world.®̂  At that tim e-so he tells u s-a  state of Chaos 
reigned. Cupid represented primary matter whose activity was repre­
sented by the vis imposed by God on the mass of primitive particles. 
In more concrete words, primary matter was then not deprived of 
form, appetite and virtue, although they all existed in a very simple 
and undetermined manner, which did not yet have the specificity of 
complex bodies. All subsequent specifications arose as an emanation 
of primary matter, primary form, and the principle of motion. Prop­
erties such as weight, hardness, etc., as well as the diverse motions are 
the result of the forms imposed by God’s agency. This description of 
atomism belongs to Bacon’s contemplative accounts, whose goal it
®® Dignitate, i, p. 524.
Sapientia, vi, p. 652.
Descriptio, ill, p. 729.
®® Hesse, “Francis Bacon,” p. 233.
The date of De principiis has been much discussed. I agree with Graham Rees 
that the work has to be dated to a date not much after 1612. See F. Bacon, The Oxford 
Francis Bacon [Rees e.a.], vol. vi, pp. xxviii-xxix, n. 61.
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is to differentiate between the principles and the origins of things; 
between atoms and secondary forms; between Chaos and cosmos. 
This essentially ontological account of the atom does not touch the 
question of its relationship to scientific practice.
Bacon uses the two basic concepts of principle and origin so as 
to organize his cosmological doctrine in his allegorical texts more 
clearly. These two concepts should be kept in mind if we wish to 
understand allegorical atomism and its relationship to later develop­
ments in Bacon’s matter theory. The fable of Cupid represents the 
principles of the world, while the fable of Coelum speaks of the ori­
gins of the world. Since each represents a stage in the chronological 
epochs of the cosmos, the principia rerum (primary matter) must be 
studied before the origines mundi (system of the world)
Bacon introduces an innovation into sixteenth-century mythol­
ogy by identifying Cupid with the atom.®̂  By doing so, he substan­
tially changes the usual conception of the beginnings of the world, 
creating a primordial link between Chaos and Cupid. The relation 
of matter (Chaos) to atoms (Cupid) was in origin one of total in­
clusion: the total mass of matter was nothing but the aggregate of 
atomic particles. This coexistence of Chaos and Cupid disappeared 
when the phenomenal fabric of the world (also called schematismus 
magnus or systema mundi) was created by God, with all pre-existent 
matter now attaining its highest specification. According to this ex­
planation, creation means the shift in the condition of matter from 
being unformed to being formed to the highest possible degree. As 
for Chaos, that formless representation of matter created ex nihilo, it 
ceases to exist in the process of hexaemeral creation.
This transformation of matter without annihilation is made pos­
sible because Cupid existed inside this Chaos informis. In other words, 
the mass of matter subsists, and yet changes, because atoms were al­
ready contained in Chaos. As a factor of continuity, the atom is the 
natural entity persisting throughout the shift from Chaos to cosmos. 
Through the divine Word, atoms go from disorder to order, produc­
ing orderly atomic structures without losing their essential primary 
form of matter. Bacon here not only appeals to mythology, but also 
to Holy Writ, glossing the first lines of Genesis as follows: “it is not 
written that God created matter in the beginning, but that He creat-
^ Deprincipiis, iii, p. 87.
On Bacon and the mythological tradition, see Lemmi, The Classical Deities.
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ed Heaven and E a r t h . T h i s  pre-hexaemeral matter was unformed 
secundum totum, because secundum partes, it had one primary form. 
In this biblical context, as in the mythological context before, “cre­
ation” is understood to mean the beginning in time of the orderly 
world-or its “origin,” in Bacon’s language.
Other features of the origins of the world are described in the 
fable of Coelum. Unfortunately, De principiis remained unfinished, 
and we do not know much of what Bacon intended to write. We can 
say that the brief reference to the myth of Coelum in De principiis 
should be read in the light of the account offered in De sapientia 
veterum, in which Bacon associated Coelum with Democritus’ atom­
ism. The myth of Coelum speaks of the several periods of the world’s 
origin, which extended from Chaos to the present, with Coelum rep­
resenting the concavity, which encloses all matter. The same myth 
also makes use of “the topic of infinity,” because there were two the­
ories of infinity to which Bacon pays special attention.The first is 
Anaxagoras’ doctrine of an infinite number of shaped and specific 
principles (homoeomeriae), w hich  Bacon accuses of distorting the very 
notion of “principle” as it presumes original differentiation in nature 
that renders superfluous the search for the origin of multiplicity. To 
Bacon, it seemed obvious that such an infinity of homoeomeriae could 
not qualify as “principles.”*’̂  The second infinity was the one associ­
ated with ancient atomism. Bacon alludes to it in his Descriptio globi 
intellectualis (ca. i6 i  2), written at approximately the same time as De 
principiis. In the Descriptio, which is mainly concerned with astrono­
my, Bacon writes that Democritus had postulated an infinite quantity 
of matter, but a limited variety of atomic forms.® Although some 
followers of Democritus and Epicurus had claimed that their mas­
ters had torn down the walls of the world. Bacon argues that their 
assumptions did not entail any infinity. Multiform worlds as could 
be formed from infinitely many atoms could still be closed and even 
spherical like our visible world; and even if an infinite universe could 
not have an absolute center, it could still contain spherical parts. In
De principiis, p. K4'̂ , iii, p. 86. “Neque enim scriptus est, quod Deus Hylen in 
principio creavit, sed Coelum et Terram.”
® Sapientia, vi, p. 649; De principiis, p. ki 1''; iii, p. 94: “Ille enim locus de Infinito 
ad parabolam Coeli pertinet.”
® Dignitate, 1, p. 523; De principiis, iii, p. 87.
® Temporis partus masculus, iii, p. 537; Abdecarium, ii, p. 86. Democritus postulat­
ed an infinite variety of atomic forms. Lucretius, by contrast, postulated a limited 
number of forms in De rerum natura, 1.72-79; i i . i  14 4 -1 1 4 5 ; 111.522-531, 10 4 8 -10 76 ; 
V.416.
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Other words, Democritus had analyzed the parts of the world quite 
correctly, but had not possessed the same ability to explain its gen­
eral structure. Democritus “was a good dissector of the world, but 
in matters concerning its structure he was even worse than ordinary 
philosophers.”®
Although Bacon rejected the notion of an infinite world, he thus 
still recognized the great value of Democritus’ physical explanations 
“within the world.”® A  related judgement is expressed in Bacon’s 
criticism of the methodological dangers arising from atomism, as is 
formulated in the Idols of the Cave. There he comments that while 
some minds tend to pay more attention to the whole than to the 
parts, other minds prefer the parts to the whole. Scientific research 
will result in blunders when unequal importance is attached to either 
the parts or the whole. The specific blunder of the atomist school 
resided in its obsession with the particles and its near neglect of the 
larger fabric of the world.® However, in his Descriptio, Bacon does not 
yet question either the ontological validity of atoms or their operative 
use. His point of criticism relates to cosmology and to the notion of 
an infinite u n w erse- ad parabolam Coelis pertinent.
3. Atomic Attributes
In the Cogitationes, atoms account for the extreme subtlety of nature. 
In De principiis. Bacon goes on to ascribe a range of attributes to 
atoms so as to make it possible for them to express this subtlety. For 
he maintains that the prime entities are not abstract things, as many 
theories had erroneously assumed, but always conjoin in their being 
matter, form and action. These prime entities are precisely those 
atoms, of which the existence in nature must be beyond doubt.® 
The atom is a vis vel virtus, which is adorned (ornatus), i.e. a primary 
form from which all other attributes stem.’** However, these atoms do 
not resemble any of the bodies we are perceptually acquainted with:
® Descriptio, p. E i ' ';  iii, pp. 737-738: “Verum Democritus sector mundi bonus fuit, 
in integralibus autem mundi, etiam infra mediocres Philosophos.”
® I disagree with Rees, who sees here a rejection of Democritus’ astronomy and 
atomic matter. Rees, “Atomism,” p. 568.
^  Novum organum, i, p. 170.
® De principiis, iii, pp. 82-86.
On the Timaeic root of these views, cf. Briggs, Francis Bacon, p. 141.
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Thus atoms are not like fiery sparks, drops of water, bubbles of air, 
specks of dust, nor like tiny amounts of spirit or ether. Nor is their 
power and form something heavy or light, hot or cold, dense or rare, 
hard or soft, such as we find them in larger bodies, since these virtues 
and others of the kind are products of composition and combina­
tion.̂ ^
In order to justify the assertion that atoms are the principles of things. 
Bacon offers the following argument, by which the atom is said to 
be the primary matter, principle or cause of all things that possess as 
their first form an appetite for their self-conservation:
Now an abstract principle is not an entity, and again, a mortal entity 
is not a principle; so that a clearly irresistible necessity drives men’s 
thoughts (if they want to be consistent) to the atom, which is a true en­
tity, having matter, form, dimension, place, resistance, appetite, motion 
and emanation. Likewise, amid the destruction of all natural bodies, it 
remains constant and eternal. For since the corruptions of the greater 
bodies are so many and various, it is absolutely necessary that that which 
remains as an unchanging center should be something either potential 
or extremely small.
De principiis, i, p. 1 i n ,  p. 82: “Democritus atomos sive semina, atque eorum 
virtutem, nullius rei similia quae sub sensum cadere posset asseruit. Itaque Atomi 
neque ignis scintillis, neque Aquae guttis, neque Aurae bullis, neque pulveris granis, 
neque spiritus aut aetheris minutiis, similes sunt. Neque vis et forma eorum aut 
grave quiddam est aut leve, aut calidum aut frigidum, aut densum aut rarum, aut 
durum aut molle, qualia in corporibus grandioribus inveniuntur; cum istae virtutes, 
et reliquae id genus compositae sint et conflatae” (my italics). According to Rees, 
“Atomism,” pp. 563, 552, the claim here is that atoms “are not the same as” spirits; 
Rees therefore concludes that this passage implies an incompatibility between atoms 
and pneumatic matter. And since tangible matter can turn into pneumatic one, he 
deduces that tangible matter does not consist of atomic particles. I think that Rees 
is wrong, because he mistakes the very relation established in De principiis, iii, p. 82. 
In order to argue for the imperceptibility of atoms. Bacon deals with a relation of 
external similitude (similes), not with a relation of ontological identity. And even if 
he had meant a relation of identity, Rees’ conclusion would still not follow, because 
from “a  is not identical to b ,” it does not necessarily follow that A is incompatible 
with B, nor that b  is not composed of A. In conclusion, De principiis, iii, p. 82 is not 
about an incompatibility between atoms and pneumatic matter.
De principiis, p. M3'̂ ; iii, p. 111: “Principium autem non est Ens; Ens mortale 
non est Principium; ut necessitas plane invincibilis hominum cogitationes (si sibi 
constare velint) compellat ad Atomum, quod est verum Ens, materiatum, formatum, 
dimensum, locatum, habens Antitypiam, Appetitum, Motum, Emanationem. Idem 
per omnium corporum Naturalium interims manet inconcussum et aetemum. Nam 
cum tot and tarn variae sint corporum majorum corruptiones, omnino necesse est, 
ut quod tamquam centrum manet immutabile, id aut potentiale quiddam sit, aut 
minimum.”
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It may seem surprising that Bacon wants to conclude his reasoning 
by such an appeal to “invincible necessity” {necessitas invincibilis). 
However, it should be understood in the light of his discussions up­
on various principles proposed by Greek philosophy, which involve 
two major premises: “an abstract principle is not an entity” and “a 
mortal entity is not a principle.” Hence a real principle cannot be an 
abstract entity. However, the deduction of the other atomic proper­
ties (dimension, place, resistance or antitypia, appetite, motion and 
emanation) goes beyond these premises. Bacon’s argument must 
have been as follows: if primary matter does have a non-specified 
form, this form must then be the simplest possible, i.e. corporeity, 
intended as a material, extended quantum. And lest this quantum of 
matter be destroyed, it needs resistance {antitypia), which protects it 
against annihilation. This antitypia serves two purposes, namely the 
resistance to annihilation and the conservation of matter.
The notion of atomic resistance goes back to the Stoic tradition, 
according to which antitypia (dvmvjiia) means the resistance of mat­
ter, which defines the difference between space and body.’  ̂ In turn, 
Epicurus had attributed antitypia (resistance to penetration) to mat­
ter, and opposed it to the lack of resistance found in the void.̂  ̂The 
concept of antitypia reappeared in contemporary authors known to 
Bacon such as William Gilbert and Francesco Patrizi,'̂  ̂who consid­
ered the difference between space and matter to lie in the latter’s 
impenetrability. For Bacon, who adopts this concept, antitypia is, 
however, an essentially active property.’®
According to the description found in the Novum organum 
(1620), antitypia is the primary motion as previously described in 
De principiis, that is, a motion inherent in matter, because of which 
the latter is able to ward off annihilation.”  Here, the determination 
of primary motion is the same as the determination of primary form. 
Atomic antitypia is the manifestation of constancy in a quantity of 
matter at a corpuscular level, a fundamental principle of Bacon’s
Von Arnim, Stoicorum veterum fragmenta, vol. iii, p. 315.
”  Epicurus, Opere [Arrighetti], p. 29 (24.49).
Gilbert, de Mundo nostro, p. 66; Patrizi, Nova de universis, fol. 78'̂ .
As Henry, “Occult Qualities” has noted, the concept of matter as an essentially 
active being became commonplace in seventeenth-century English corpuscularian- 
ism. Bacon was possibly one of the first Englishmen who introduced activity as an 
essential property of matter, and he did so by means of the concept of antitypia.
”  Novum organum, i, p. 330. Walter Warner also holds that matter’s quiddity con­
sists of “corporeity or resistibility (or antitypia or hardness).” Cf. Warner, B.M. Add. 
MSS. 4395, fols. 2 1 2 -2 1 3  quoted by Kargon, Atomism in England, p. 36.
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physics. For, like the Averroists, Bacon accepts undetermined cor­
poreity, but in addition, he postulates a motion of self-conservation. 
It is not by chance that Bacon comes to this assumption, for it is 
the natural consequence of his quantitative view on nature, which 
pervades his speculative and practical philosophy as well as the mi­
croscopic and macroscopic realms of his natural philosophy. In the 
Novum organum, antitypia is the sole material appetite that does not 
presuppose the existence of another portion of matter, but which is 
inherent in every portion of matter. Other motions, by contrast, are 
relative to other bodies and thus presuppose a multiplicity of bod­
ies.’® In other words, primary matter tends toward self-conservation 
without needing any other entity to satisfy this desire. As for the 
attributes dimensum et locatum, they are justified by and contained 
in the very notion of antitypia. For if the atom has a resistance to 
annihilation, then it must have an impenetrable spatial dimension.
That matter is conserved through form was a common opin­
ion in Aristotelian natural philosophy. In the Coimbra Commentary 
on Aristotle’s Physics, the issue is brought up in the discussion con­
cerning the difference between creation and conservation. The real 
distinction between the creation of matter by God and the conser­
vation of matter by form is said to be due to the real distinction 
between matter and form. In other words, matter is conserved by 
the form, which inheres in it from the beginning of its existence; 
and although matter could be conserved by God, insofar as it exists 
in the physical world, it is in fact conserved by form. Thus, conser­
vation constitutes the first law of the physical world qua physical.’® 
Bacon agrees with the Coimbra Jesuits that form conserves matter, 
which went against the ideas of some Augustinians, who thought that 
matter could persist without form, at least if God should wish it.®®
The De principiis offers further insights into Bacon’s concept of 
atomic motion and his criticism of the Democritean theory. Here the 
parable of Cupid is used to demonstrate how the “heterogeneity” in 
both substance and motion of atoms is preserved. “Heterogeneous” is 
used here in a peculiar sense. Bacon considers Democritus’ account 
to be incoherent, because he did not attribute a heterogeneous mo­
tion {motum heterogeneum) to atoms, although he did attribute hetero­
Novum organum, i, pp. 331-349.
Collegium Conimbricense, In octo libros Physicorum (1616), Bk. viii, ch. ii, q. 1, 
a. 4. Carvalho, “Medieval Influences.”
®® Reif, “The Textbook Tradition,” p. 26.
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geneous bodies (different sizes and figures) and virtues to them.®’ 
And yet, Democritus did attribute a motion of descent toward the 
center of the Earth to heavier atoms and a motion of ascent toward 
the heavens to lighter atoms. This constitutes two “non heteroge­
neous” motions belonging to two specific kinds of larger bodies. In 
Bacon’s opinion though, however, the primary motion {motus primus) 
of atoms had to be “heterogeneous.” It is unlike the specific motions 
of larger bodies (ascent, descent, contraction, rotation, etc.), be­
cause the beginnings of all specific motions of larger bodies must 
be contained in the atomic primary motion.®  ̂“Heterogeneous” thus 
seems to mean “not yet specified.”
Immutability is another attribute of atoms. While the atom un­
dergoes changes of position, its substance remains immutable. Ba­
con’s argument, although difficult to grasp, it goes roughly as follows. 
According to his first premise, immutability is a consequence either 
of potentiality or of minimality. The second premise says that it is 
not possible to ascribe potentiality to the atom, because, since the 
first potential entity cannot be potential in the same way that the 
rest of entities are, “it must necessarily be something wholly abstract, 
since it denies all actuality and contains all potentiality.”®® But as a 
principle cannot be abstract, the atom cannot be merely potential. 
Hence the second alternative must be valid: atomic immutability is 
due to minimal size of the atom. This attribute can be understood 
in a quantitative sense, as in the Cogitationes, where the atom is de­
fined as the minima portio of matter, because it cannot be divided any 
further.®̂
As for emanation, it results from the triple atomic character­
ization of matter-form-action. Bacon had complained about those 
philosophers who postulated that action (or motion) was exclusively 
an emanation of an abstract form. For him, emanation was a diffusive 
action of the atomic vis which had the effect of creating the multi­
plicity of motions {actiones, motus naturales) and essences {essentiae,
®’ De principiis, iii, p. 82: “Democritus enim non omnino parabolae tan turn, sed et 
sibi quoque impar et fere contrarius reperitur ... Debuit enim motum heterogeneum 
atomo tribuere, non minus quam corpus heterogeneum etvirtutem heterogeneam.” 
®2 Deprincipiis, iii, p. 82: “Atque nihilominus et in corpore atomi elementa omnium 
corporum, et in motu et in virtute atomi initia omnium motuum et virtutum insunt.” 
Deprincipiis, p. M3''; iii, p. 111: “necesse est ut plane abstractum sit, cum omnem 
actu abneget, et omnem potentiam contineat.”
®̂ Cogitationes, in, p. 15. On the notion of minimum in Lucretius, see Gemelli, 
Aspetti, p. 162. Lucretius, De rerum natura [Bailey], 1.609-627. Minimum has other 
meanings in Sapientia, vi, p. 656.
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virtutes) in this world: “matter (whatever it is) is so adorned, prepared 
and formed that every virtue, essence, action and natural motion can 
be the consequence and emanation of it.”®̂ Emanation seems to con­
stitute the key by which Bacon explained the passage from unity to 
multiplicity, from Chaos to cosmos, and from the potency of atoms 
to the constitution of the real and actual world. Everything in nature, 
with the exception of the atom, was in his eyes an effect of atomic 
emanation, which is a part of the dynamic nature of atoms not ob­
jectively distinct from their appetite, motion, and action. Emanation 
describes a special aspect of atomic dynamics, namely their power 
to constitute the world’s heterogeneous multiplicity. Bacon proba­
bly borrowed the term emanatio from Telesio, who had revived this 
Neoplatonist concept during the Renaissance.^®
4. Matter and Form
How can atomic structure by itself produce such a cosmic multiplic­
ity? Bacon’s primary form is less specific than the rest of the forms 
and therefore has a distinct status. In the light of ideas introduced 
mainly in the Novum organum and anticipated in Valerius Terminus 
(ca. 1603), we may assume that atomic emanation result in forms of 
simple natures, the combination of which results in forms of com­
posed nature. In his De principiis, Bacon denied that density, rarity, 
etc. were the properties of atoms, for as these qualities were more 
complex, they necessarily arise from atoms. If emanation depends 
only on motion and on the form of resistance, then it is necessary 
to suppose that such motion undergoes change, so that complex 
motions can arise from it. However, if such a change does occur, it 
apparently does not come from the appetite of resistance, since this 
is merely a search for self-conservation. Consequently, the alterna­
tive was to postulate an external cause, which Bacon identified with 
the Word of God. But a hitherto overlooked paradox seems to arise 
here. On the one hand, primary matter is always said to be funda­
De principiis, p. K3'', iii, p. 86: “asserenda materia (qualiscunque ea sit) ita ornata 
et apparata, et formata, ut omnis virtus, Essentia, actio, atque motus naturalis ejus 
consecutio, et emanatio esse possit.”
Cf. Telesio, De rerum natura, Bk. ii, chs. 5-7, pp. 50-52; De principiis, iii, pp. 
96-97. A further source may be Roger Bacon, for whom the concept of emanation 
was central. Francis Bacon mentioned Roger Bacon in Temporis partus masculus, iii, 
p. 534, but we have no evidence which manuscripts he had access to. Cf. editor’s 
Preface to Novum organum, i, pp. 89-90.
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mentally active and its appetite of resistance to motions invincible. 
On the other hand its activity is unable to overcome the inherently 
chaotic nature of matter by producing the species by itself. While 
the vis of primary matter is thus invincible and pervades nature as a 
principio usque ad finem, it does not suffice to produce a change in its 
own primitive state. In other words, the atom remains ineffectual as 
a principle of things without God’s intervention.
Aware of this issue. Bacon asked himself “whether this created 
matter, through long revolutions of ages, by the power originally 
given to it, could have gathered and turned itself into that perfect 
schematism.”®'̂ This question had previously puzzled such Francis­
can authors as Petrus Olivus, who had claimed that matter has the 
capacity of moving itself, a capacity given by God at the moment 
of creation so that it could achieve a specific form. According to 
Olivus, the intrinsic mobility of matter is the manifestation of sem­
inal reasons, which are its active causes.®® However, neither Bacon 
nor Olivus concluded that created matter alone, without mediation 
of the divinity, could have constituted the actual world. Bacon ob­
serves that perhaps this question is something that we should not 
even ask. But what were the reasons behind Bacon’s silence about 
this? The usual answer of historians to questions like this is to appeal 
to the philosopher’s fear of possible religious censure. And perhaps 
this is indeed one of Bacon’s reasons.®̂  But perhaps another reason 
may have been that Bacon had doubts about this and consequently 
did not embrace a definitive position. In fact, in De principiis, Ba­
con seems to have attributed more power to atoms than in earlier 
works. In A  Confession o f Faith (1602), the laws of nature are said to 
have “begun to be in IForce” after the hexaemeral work had been 
completed.*^® Later, in De sapientia veterum, the initial intervention of 
the atomic force in the world is dated to a period subsequent to the 
creation of the species. By then. Bacon had reached the view that 
Cupid was the youngest of the gods, “since until the species were 
constituted he could not be vigorous.”®̂ Finally, in De principiis, Ba­
con appears to have begun to doubt whether the activity of matter
®̂ De principiis, p. M2''; iii, p. 111: “Utrum vero Materia ilia creata, per longos saecu- 
lorum circuitus, ex vi prima indita, se in ilium optimum Schematismum colligere et 
vertere potuisset...”
®® Perez Estevez, La materia, pp. 331-332.
®® Briggs, Francis Bacon, pp. 141-142 makes this suggestion.
Confession, vn, p. 221.
Sapientia, vi, p. 731; vi, p. 656: “cum non ante species constitutas vigere potuis­
set.” I have modified the translation.
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could have rendered divine intervention in the creation of species 
superfluous, but he cautiously seems to have preferred to conceal 
his doubts.
While in De principiiSy Bacon speaks of primary form and places its 
ability to emanate on the same level as primary matter, in the Novum  
organum, he speaks of secondary forms (subdivided into forms of 
simple natures and forms of composed natures) and attributes a spe­
cial emanative power to them. These forms are in fact characterized 
as a fans emanationis, natura naturans, while bodies are said to be 
natura naturata. In the seventeenth century, the fusion of Neoplaton­
ism and Aristotelianism created the notion of form as an emanative 
agent, whose effects are found both in the spontaneous motions of 
the elements and the production of their proper accidents.®  ̂ But 
in spite of this precedent, the emanative agency of form, according 
to the Novum organum, is mainly the consequence of its essentially 
operative character. When Bacon there introduces his own concept 
of form and attempts to set it off from the substantial forms of the 
Aristotelians, scientific applicability seems to constitute his main cri­
terion. Baconian form is not only a theoretical law but an operative 
rule as well, which allows science to manipulate nature successfully. 
In this way, form possesses an ability to “emanate” artificial activities 
which matter itself does not have.®̂
Bacon’s treatment of Cupid in De principiis distinguishes be­
tween essence and system and finds this distinction exemplified 
in the two entities of primary matter and forms. Bacon considers 
both of them laws, but with distinct tasks. Primary matter is nature’s 
unica et summaria lex and lies at the top of the pyramid of knowl­
edge, representing the element of unity in nature, which generates 
all variety by multiplying itself.®̂  Forms, in turn, arise from the ag­
glomeration of atoms that differ from each other in position and 
quantity.®̂  In De principiis. Bacon recalls what he had already said 
in the Novum organum: “a true Form is such that it derives a given 
nature from the source of an essence which exists in several sub­
jects, and which is better known to nature (as they say) than the 
Form itself.”®® Logically speaking, the fans essentiae is here the genus 
of a given nature {instar generis veri). Motion, for instance, is the 
genus of the form of heat.®’ Physically speaking, the notion of the 
“source of essence” appears to describe a nature more general than 
any given physical substance. In the hierarchy of physics, it would 
thus constitute the highest essence, which resides in primary mat­
ter.
Motion is permanent in nature; each form is ultimately reducible 
to the appetite of matter for self-conservation.®® The reduction of the 
various forms to the primary form of resistance plays a very important 
role, because it demonstrates that for Bacon, motion is a universal 
determination of matter. There is no natural reality without mo­
tion-which is why the new philosophy must search for the principia 
moventia rerum. Forced to continue across changes, matter must al­
ways continue to move in order to conserve its identity. Passivity is 
thus alien to it. As a result. Bacon must reject Telesio’s view that heat 
and cold are the principles that move an essentially passive matter.
Figure 1 provides a schema of the various themes discussed up till 
now. They are grouped according to the polar concepts of principle 
and origin. Obviously, an unfinished and posthumous work such 
as De principiis imposes severe limits to interpreters. De principiis is 
nevertheless a valuable source of Bacon’s thought at the height of 
his reflections on matter theory. According to Rawley, the Novum 
organum was composed in the course of a twelve-year period before 
it was published, which means that some ideas concerning the theory 
of forms may have already been developed at the time when Bacon 
wrote De principiis. It may thus be possible to read the main concepts 
of Bacon’s natural philosophy and the key introductory aphorisms of 
the second book of the Novum organum with this in mind. In addition, 
it helps us understand why Bacon seriously questioned the atomist 
model in his last major work.
®̂ Reif, “The Textbook Tradition,” p. 27. Perez Ramos, Francis Bacon's Idea, pp.
90-91-
®̂ Ibid., pp. 114-115.
®̂ Dignitate, i, p. 655, 567; Valerius terminus, iii, p. 220; De principiis, ill, pp. 81, 86. 
®® Novum organum, i, pp. 168-169, 228, 232, 262. Lemmi, The Classical Deities, 
p. 94 and Hesse, “Francis Bacon,” pp. 229, 238 have noted that Baconian form is to 
be understood as an atomic aggregate. Gemelli, Aspetti, pp. 312-313 claims that the 
primitive inseparability and co-existence of atomism and forms is already present in 
Cogitationes.
®® F. Bacon, The New Organon Qardine e.a.], p. 104; i, p. 230: “Forma vera tabs est, 
ut naturam datam ex fonte aliquo essentiae deducat quae inest pluribus, et notior 
est naturae (ut loquuntur) quam ipsa Forma.”
®’  Perez Ramos, Francis Bacon's Idea, pp. 120-125.
®® On Bacon’s simple natures, see Jardine, Francis Bacon, pp. 109-112 and Fattori, 
“Nature semplici.”
Table 1
Matter and form during the pre- and post-hexaemeral periods
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Unity of nature Multiplicity of nature




System of the world
Supernatural agent Creation ex nihilo 
Work of manufacture 
(Matter)
Work of the six days 
Work of style 
(Acts-laws)
Alegorical figures Mercury Penelope and suitors^
Natural agent The atom/primary matter: 
Highest law of essences 
Fons essentiae
Forms:
Laws of acts 
Fons emanationis
Alegorical figures Cupid Coelum, Saturn, Jupiter, etc.^°°
Intervening forces Primary fonn: 
Antitypia
Secondary forms (of simple 
or composed natures): 
qualities / species / genera
These differences between the principles of things and the origins 
of the world, as schematized above, can also profitably be applied 
to Bacon’s views on the relationship between matter and form. At a 
first glance, Bacon’s views seem to be contradictory. Yet a remarkable 
correlation with Plato’s and Aristotle’s concpet of “naked” matter 
may be found in his interpretation of the myth of Pan, as described 
in De dignitate. For after examining several theories about the origin 
of the world. Bacon says:
But those who (like Plato and Aristotle) have represented matter as 
entirely despoiled, shapeless, and indifferent to forms, come much 
nearer to the figure of the parable. For they have presented matter as 
a common harlot, and forms as suitors.
Penelope represents matter penetrated by forms (symbolised by the suitors). 
Each deity represents a different aspect of the process leading to the actual 
world, which according to the Scriptures was God’s hexaemeral work.
Dignitate, iv, p. 320; i, p. 523: “Qui vero Materiam omnino spoliatam, et in- 
formem, et ad Formas indifferentem introduxerunt, (ut Plato et Aristoteles) multo
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This fragment is difficult to interpret, because in Deprincipiis Bacon 
had affirmed that primary matter is neither abstract nor naked, and 
he had viewed the Platonic and Aristotelian cosmologies as the most 
false, because of their concept of abstract m a t t e r . T h e  Presocrat- 
ic philosophers, by contrast, had come closer to the truth. Some, 
like Thales, Anaximenes, or Heraclitus, for example, had attributed 
mutability to the principle of nature; while others, such as Empe­
docles, Parmenides, and much later, Telesio, had maintained that 
there were many principles. Democritus’ view had come closest to 
the nature of things, since it postulated a single and unchangeable 
principle.
In De principiis and De dignitate, we find two very similar frag­
ments which appear, however, to affirm the opposite view. In order 
to understand what Bacon meant in each of these, their contexts 
are of relevance. The first fragment describes the very beginning 
of the history of nature-Chaos. The second fragment focuses on 
the post-hexaemeral epoch, over which Pan ruled as the represen­
tative deity. Consequentiy, “form” has a distinctly different meaning 
in each of these two situations. When matter is said to be “formed” 
ex parte, “form” signifies the primary determination of matter, or its 
resistance to annihilation. When matter is said to be “unformed” ex 
toto, “form” signifies the law by which bodies act, or its formal cause. 
Bacon’s interpretation of Cupid’s garments points to this semantic 
distinction.
Naked Cupid-who has perse an identity, but is nude-is mirrored 
by the atom -a simple principle and single substance. Bacon accuses 
rivalling theories of having overdetermined primary matter-just as 
if Cupid were clothed (non exuto). By overdetermining matter, such 
theories erred more gravely than those claiming matter’s absolute 
abstractness.In short, an understanding of Bacon’s conceptual 
polarities as schematized above helps us to find a thematic continuity 
between those different fragments.
In his explanation of the world’s origin, as portrayed in the 
fable of Pan, in De dignitate. Bacon shows a certain affinity to the 
notion of unformed matter. Here, the formation of the actual world 
is said to have taken place during successive periods and to be the 
work of one single God who created the material Chaos. At the
etiam proprius et propensius ad parabolae figuram accesserunt. Posuerunt enim 
Materiam tanquam publicam meretricem. Formas vero tanquam procos.”
***2 Deprincipiis, in, p. 84.
De principiis, iii, pp. 86-87.
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historical moment of Chaos, the “matter of heaven and earth was 
created without the forms.”'®̂ In other words, Bacon’s agreement 
with Aristotle and Plato is limited to that period in the history of 
nature when matter was absolutely naked, unformed, and deprived 
of secondary forms.
By contrast, the subject of De principiis is the atom and its re­
lation to Chaos, as becomes clear when we look at the role played 
by the fable of Cupid. Bacon emphasizes the contrast between un­
formed, passive Chaos and active, formed primary matter, both of 
which coexisted before hexaemeral creation began. For Bacon, both 
primary matter and the primeval chaotic mass are material entities of 
which the sole individuating mark is the distinguishability of the parts 
from the whole. Bacon continues by analyzing primary matter as a 
framework within which the various Greek cosmologies can be criti­
cized. Notably, Bacon critically assesses whether either the Platonist 
or Aristotelian attributes of matter measure up to those provided in 
De principiis. Bacon deems that their description of prime matter as 
abstracta, potentialis, informis, spoliata, passiva, fluens, tanquam accessori- 
urn formae, phantastica as falling short of his own criteria. His analysis 
incidentally betrays once more a debt to both the Augustinian ac­
count of creation with its conceptual duality of creare et facere and 
to the Franciscan-Averroist conception of primary matter. In short, 
then. Bacon’s judgements regarding Plato’s and Aristotle’s concep­
tions of unformed matter cease to be contradictory once the relevant 
contexts are taken into account.
Elsewhere in his writings, Bacon strongly rejects the Aristotelian 
distinction between the lunar and sublunar world. He comments that 
Aristotle’s sublunar matter is like a whore yearning for forms and 
supralunar matter like a mother, characterizations that are closer 
to superstition and popular opinion than to p hi l o so p h y. I n  his 
critique. Bacon thus rejects once more the distinction between two 
kinds of matter. Note that Bacon does not categorically reject the 
existence of unformed matter yearning for forms, but rather the 
limitation of such matter to the sublunar world.
A  related account is found in Sylva sylvarum, in which Bacon 
mentions experimental evidence that “dissatisfied” bodies desire to 
absorb other bodies. For instance, air transmits light, sounds, smells, 
and vapors, the cause of which remains unexplained. But Bacon 
writes: “as for the pretty assertion, that matter is like a common
Confession, vii, p. 221. 
Cogitationes, iii, p. 33.
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S tru m p et that d e sire th  all fo rm s, it is b u t  a w a n d e r in g  n o tio n ” - a  
n o tio n , in  o th e r  w ords, w ith o u t so lid  fo u n d a tio n .
Bacon generally views concepts of origin and principle as inde­
pendent from one another. He may have thought that a theory may 
speculate competently about the system of the world, while simulta­
neously postulating wrong principles. According to Bacon, Telesio’s 
philosophy presented such a case. It talked non male about the system 
of the world, but imperitissime about its principles.^®’ By contrast, the 
Presocratics had been successful in their explanation of the fabric 
of the world, but they had erred when trying to establish its princi­
ple.
It may seem astonishing that after having searched for and iden­
tified the atomic principle of nature. Bacon implicitly admits that 
a mistake concerning the principium is irrelevant to the develop­
ment of theses concerning the principiata. Although Bacon agrees 
with Telesio’s speculations about natural species, he finds them lim­
ited insofar as they could not account for material schematisms.^®  ̂
It is then possible to speculate adequately about the phenomena of 
heat, as Telesio did, while at the same time ignoring its corpuscular 
motion?̂ ®® Can a philosophy speculate non male, when it does not ex­
plain forms in terms of atomic structures? Indirectly such questions 
deal with the relationship between knowledge and power in Bacon’s 
program. After all, knowing that heat is caused by atomic motion 
becomes less important when heat can be manipulated even without 
such knowledge? As Viano correctly remarks, Bacon’s program of 
knowledge is heuristically oriented to scientific practice.̂ ^® It reveals 
not the ideal, but the true relation between knowledge and power 
in science. Consequently, it is understandable that Bacon approves 
of certain Telesian theses, which served as instruments to achieve 
certain operative effects, despite the fact that these theories ignored 
the very constitution of matter.
®̂® Sylva sylvarum, li, p. 601.
*®’  De principiis, iii, p. 110.
*®® De principiis, iii, pp. 79, 87, 111. On the meaning of material schematisms, see 
footnote 114.
'®® Novum organum, i, p. 266.
^̂® Viano, “Esperienza e natura.”
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5. Latent Schematisms and Flexible Matter
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A  turning-point is to be found in the Novum organum (1620) which, 
like the Cogitationes, considers atomic theory to be an instrument 
for the operative goals of science, leaving truth or falsity aside. The 
requirements of the inductive method had led Bacon to introduce 
more precise causal concepts, which could give an account of exper­
imental evidence. As in the Cogitationes, Bacon writes of the atomist 
theory as being useful for the goals of the new science, but refrains 
from deciding about its truth value. In the context of the Idols of the 
Theatre, Bacon remarks that all ultimate explanations are worthless 
for scientific praxis, “since all utility and opportunity for application 
lies in the intermediate causes.” *̂’ Bacon invokes this point both 
against the extreme abstraction of the Aristotelians and the extreme 
dissection of the atomist. In the Novum organum, he is neither con­
cerned with Aristotelian potential matter nor with ancient atomism, 
but with the ability of given entities to play functional roles in an 
inductive science. Neither the potential and unformed matter of 
the Aristotelians, nor the atoms of Democritus and Epicurus can 
accomplish this. For even if they “were true, they could do littie to 
improve men’s f o r t u n e s .V ie w e d  in this light, the atom, an entity 
of extreme subtlety, can hardly serve Baconian science.
And yet. Bacon remains persuaded that natural inquiry must be 
exercised by means of an anatomical separation of the innermost 
parts. Bacon does make clear, however, that the concept of the atom, 
which presupposes non-flexible matter and a vacuum, may not be 
the analytical unit adequate to guide such an anatomy: “But we will 
not therefore end up with the atom, which presupposes a vacuum 
and rigid matter (both of which are false), but with the true particles 
(particulae verae) as they are found to be.”'''*
These particulae verae are nothing but the first configurations 
of matter that Bacon called latentes schematismiN"^ Although material
F. Bacon, The New Organon [Jardine e.a.], p. 55; i, p. 178: “omnis utilitas et 
facultas operand! in mediis consistat.”
Ibid.: “quae, etiamsi vera essent, tamen ad juvandas hominum fortunas parum 
possunt.”
F. Bacon, The New Organon [Jardine e.a.], p. 108, i, p. 234: “Neque propterea res 
deducetur ad Atomum, qui praesupponit Vacuum et materiam non fluxam (quorum 
utrumque falsum est), sed ad particulas veras, quales inveniuntur.”
Rees, “Bacon’s Philosophy,” pp. 223-243, distinguishes three Baconian mean­
ings of schematismus: the whole fabric of the world {schematismus magnus), the generic 
name of all simple qualities {schematismus materiae), and the microscopic configura-
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schematisms, too, are invisible, they represent the true texture of 
things, by which their specific virtues are determined. Admittedly, 
Bacon is not very clear about the meaning of these material schema­
tisms. They are understood here as being conglomerations of par­
ticles from which the multiple heterogeneity of bodies is derived. 
The classical atoms of Leucippus and Democritus were assumed to 
be made of hard and inflexible matter {materia non flu xa ). Accord­
ing to Bacon, however, such rigidity would prevent the intermedi­
ary transmutations that occur when bodies change their properties. 
The transmutation of bodies-incidentally the main goal of scien­
tific practice-must occur from changes of the schematisms, not of 
the atoms. As for the vacuum-the other mainstay of ancient atom­
ism-Bacon did not think it was necessary to explain changes in 
volume. Instead, he took recourse to so-called plicae (folds), which 
enabled matter to change its volume without any need for interstitial 
vacua.
It is important to note that despite Bacon’s re-evaluation of atom­
ism, the corpuscular vocabulary remains intact in such later works as 
De dignitate, Historia densi et rari, Sylva sylvarum, etc. In fact, expres­
sions like “minute bodies,” res minutae, particulae minutae and minima 
are frequently invoked to describe physical activity. This shows that 
corpuscularianism continues to operate as one of the theoretical 
bases of Bacon’s physics."® In the light of this, it is understandable 
why atomist concepts expressly associated with Democritus still main­
tained their place among the first axioms of philosophy. Thus we 
read for instance: “Nature shows itself most forcefully in its small­
est portions.”'"' Indeed, the idea that each motion has its ultimate 
cause at a microscopic level remains an undoubted principle. Thus 
each natural action is accomplished per minima, or at least through 
things too small to affect the senses. The most subtle metaschema­
tisms are nothing but a latio per mmima."® But not only motions, but 
also matter occur as minima. Phenomena are therefore explained in
tions {schematismus latens). In this paper I will use “schematism” to denote the last 
sense. Gemelli, Aspetti, pp. 182-195, explains some features of Bacon’s schematism 
and its debt to Lucretius.
Novum organum, i, p. 347.
Cogitationes, iii, p. 31; Novum organum, i, pp. 265, 307; De principiis, iii, p. 82; 
Sylva sylvarum, ii, p. 381. Soon, “minute” would be used as a general attribute of 
atoms, for instance by Henry Power. Gemelli, Aspetti, pp. 150-154, 170.
Dignitate, iv, p. 338; i, p. 541: “Natura se potissimum prodit in minimis." I have 
modified Ellis’ translation. Cf. Dignitate, i, p. 499.
Novum organum, i, pp. 232-233.
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terms of both minimae lationes and minutae particulae. For instance, 
heat is defined as the motion of minutae particulae, although the par­
ticles involved are not extremely subde.” ® Minute particles are said 
to account also for the origin of some s o u n d s . B y  the same token, 
biological processes such as the assimilation of aliments and changes 
in blood temperature happen per minima.^^  ̂ Given the criticism of 
atomism voiced in the Novum organum, we must not identify these 
minima with the minima portio of the Cogitationes and De principiis. 
Bacon is less than rigorous in his use of vocabulary and employs mi­
nutae, minima, etc., as equivalent words to denote very small portions 
of matter, but no longer those absolutely smallest portions of which 
he had spoken in earlier periods of his career.
The Sylva sylvarum contains a fragment that indicates the levels of 
material reality that Bacon had come to distinguish in his last works. 
In this fragment, he complains that the investigation of nature has 
usually been limited to visible things, while “whatsoever is invisible, 
either in respect of the fineness of the body itself, or the smallness 
of the parts, or of the subtlety of the motion” is mostly disregarded. 
There are four types of entities that belong to this class of neglected 
invisibles: 1) spirits; 2) tangible parts; 3) minute particles and their 
postures (“the more subtle differences of the minute parts and the 
posture of them in the body”); 4) motions of the particles and inner 
motions of bodies between spirits and tangible parts. Note that the 
atom is not included in this list of scientifically important, invisible 
objects. Bacon’s criticism continues thus:
And for the more subtle differences of the minute parts and the posture 
of them in the body (.. .) they are not at all touched. As for the motions 
of the minute parts of bodies, which do so great effects, they have not 
been observed at all, because they are invisible; but yet they are to 
be deprehended by experience (. . .)  Democritus said well, when they 
charged him to hold that the world was made of such little motes as 
were seen in the sun: Atomus, saith he, necessitate rationis et experientiae 
esse convincitur, atomum nemo unquam vidiO^^
Pace Rees, this reference to Democritus appears to involve more 
than merely an invocation of Presocratic authority. Rather, Bacon 
appears to call upon Democritus to make an epistemological point
Ibid., p. 265.
Sylva sylvarum, ii, pp. 343, 391. 
Historia vitae, ii, p. 182, 197. 
Sylva sylvarum, ii, p. 381.
Rees, “Atomism,” p. 564.
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for him. The quotation also appears to accept the atomic basis of na­
ture’s subtlety. If Bacon had been completely opposed to the atomist 
theory, he would have declared his opposition in this important pas­
sage, which is one of the few in the Sylva sylvarum that deals with 
theoretical issues. Bacon usually expressed his differences with other 
philosophies in order to distance himself from them -but obviously, 
this is not the case with Democritus’ atomist assumption that the 
ultimate corpuscles are imperceptible.
This point of view casts doubt upon Kargon’s view, which holds 
that Bacon first subscribed to an atomistic terminology and subse­
quently exchanged it for the pneumatic language of alchemy. Kar- 
gon believes that Bacon’s lexical shift points to a break-away from a 
mechanistic and atomistic theory in favor of an animistic and pneu­
matic o n e . B u t  it is impossible to find such a mechanistic-atomistic 
model even in Bacon’s early writings. Kargon errs in thinking that 
Bacon’s atomism was ever close to some Democritean orthodoxy.^^  ̂
In fact, we hardly ever find purely mechanistic explanations in his 
work. It is certainly true that mechanistic and animistic approaches 
were combined in later works like the De sapientia veterum, in which 
atomic motion at a distance is explained in terms of material sym­
pathies. Yet even in Bacon’s earliest writings, atomist and pneumatic 
vocabularies are interconnected. In fact, alchemical vocabulary and 
mechanical notions are interwoven: processes of alteration and sep­
aration, the flight of the spirits and the appetites of Cupid coexist 
with concepts such as the vacuum and minimal particles. Besides this. 
Bacon remains clear about the difference between atoms and pneu­
matic matter. He carefully distinguishes between atoms and pneuma, 
just as he distinguishes between atoms and all other material mani­
festations.̂ ^® In fact, his early allegorical works seem to suggest that 
pneumatic matter is composed of atoms.
In his refutation of Kargon’s claims regarding Bacon’s move 
from atomism to pneumatism, Rees has rightly shown that Bacon 
never offered any purely mechanistic explanations, although traces 
of mechanistic thinking may of course be found throughout his 
work. While fully agreeing with this point, I do not agree with 
Rees’ conclusion that Bacon had therefore never been positively
Kargon, Atomism in England, p. 42.
This has already been understood by Hesse, “Francis Bacon” and has been 
forcefully demonstrated by Gemelli, Aspetti.
Cf. De principiis, in, p. 82: “Atomi ... neque spiritus similes sunt”
Rees, “Atomism,” pp. 563-567.
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committed to atomism. The fact that Bacon modifies Greek atomism 
and looks unfavorably upon mechanistic explanations does not mean 
that his Cogitationes, the De principiis and the De sapientia veterum do 
not propagate atomist conceptions.^^*
Rees appears to overestimate the role assigned to pneumatic 
matter. If, as this author himself concedes, Bacon simultaneously 
postulated tangible and pneumatic matter and offered mechanical 
together with non-mechanical explanations, what reasons are there 
for describing his theory of matter as exclusively “pneumatic”?̂ ^̂  I 
do not even think that it may be maintained that Bacon favored 
pneumatic matter over tangible matter. Admittedly, in the Novum  
organum. Bacon attributes the typically pneumatic plicae to all mat­
ter; and he also conceives of all matter as of a sort of qualitative 
continuum ranging from the most pneumatic (ether) to the most 
tangible (the bowels of the earth), attributing the principal agency to 
the pneumatic part of the spectrum. But even here, tangible matter 
continues to provide all of nature with cohesion and organisation. 
So, if it is true that “the dichotomizing instinct is the primary feature 
of Bacon’s metaphysical vision,” then it is obvious that the activity of 
pneumatic matter is as necessary as the passivity of tangible matter.̂ *® 
But would it be true to say that the prevalence of non-mechanical 
explanations is a direct consequence of the active role of pneumatic 
matter? I do not think so; because Bacon’s non-mechanical or ani­
mistic approach to the problem of motion is not the only one that is 
compatible with pneumatic matter. Bacon could have reasoned like 
Descartes some decades later, explaining the movements of spirits in 
a mechanistic way.
Although spirits, tangible matter, and their motions were distin­
guished in the Sylva sylvarum. Bacon did not use the terms “minima,” 
“minute particles,” etc. as the exclusive attributes of either tangi­
ble or pneumatic matter, but used them for both. Therefore, I see 
no evidence for the view that atomism and a pneumatic theory are 
incompatible.^*'
It is noteworthy that Rees’ discussion of Bacon’s atomism almost entirely ignores 
the allegorical writings. Cf. Rees, “Atomism,” pp. 562-563.
Ibid., p. 563.
'*** Rees, “Matter Theory,” pp. 114-115.
Lemmi, The Classical Deities, p. 100; Hesse, “Francis Bacon,” p. 245; and Garner, 
“Francis Bacon,” p. 275 also suggest that spirits and atoms are compatible.
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6. Conclusion
2 4 1
We have seen that three main periods in Bacon’s atomism can be 
chronologically distinguished. The first appears in the Cogitationes, 
in which Bacon expresses his supports an atomism that was instru- 
mentally or heuristically conceived, without deciding whether or not 
atoms actually existed. He defined atoms as the ultimate equal par­
ticles of matter, which moved in the void and explained the subtlety 
of nature. Two central ideas led Bacon to propose the concept of 
atoms and that of pneumatic matter simultaneously. First, he thought 
both concepts were necessary conditions for explaining qualitative 
changes (the transmutation of bodies); for the vacuum on its own on­
ly explained quantitative change (through contraction and rarefac­
tion) . Secondly, Bacon found pneumatic matter and equal atoms to 
be necessary conditions for the constancy of the quantum of matter.
The second period is reflected in the allegorical works, in which 
are found Bacon’s most profound ontological considerations con­
cerning atoms. The atom is now truly considered to constitute the 
smallest real particle of matter. The form of resistance (antitypia) de­
termines its being, for mobility, appetite, dimensionality, spatiality, 
emanation, eternity, and immutability are attributes arising from this 
resistance to annihilation. By contrast, more complex attributes are 
effects of atomic agglomerations.'*^
The third and last period is most clearly exemplified by the 
Novum organum, in which Bacon distinguishes between hard atoms- 
cwm-vacuum and flexible matter without any vacuum. The reasons 
behind Bacon’s modified view have nothing to do with the antithe­
sis between mechanistic atomism and animistic pneumatism, as has 
sometimes been claimed. As we have seen. Bacon had always con­
ceived of atoms and pneumatic matter as coexistent and certainly 
not as antithetical.'** Nor was his criticism of atomism in the Novum 
organum accompanied by the introduction of an exclusively or even 
predominantly pneumatic theory of matter. His reasons were rather 
epistemological and operational. He felt that the atom was also scien­
tifically unproductive. Natural phenomena were better explained by
'*2 Gemelli, Aspetti, pp. 163-164.
'** Bacon is not an isolated case here. Several scholars have shown that animistic 
and atomist world views were not understood as incompatible by various philosophers 
of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Cf. Gregory, “Studi sull’atomismo, ii”; 
Henry, “Occult Qualities,” p. 371, n. 19; Gemelli, Aspetti, p. 142, n. 2; and Gatti and 
Clericuzio in this volume.
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the more complex, but still microscopic level of the particulae verae,
i.e., at the level of the schematismi. At this last stage of his develop­
ment, then. Bacon did not deny the existence of the atom, at least 
not explicitly, but handed over all of its explanatory functions to the 
schematisms.
Klein righdy describes schematisms in terms of the tangible and 
pneumatic matter resulting from its textura and recognizes in it a cer­
tain dose of atomistic influence. But there is more to it: as Gemelli 
has demonstrated, the term textura is taken from the Lucretian vo­
cabulary.'^  ̂ In the light of this, we may conjecture that schematisms 
were understood by Bacon as being composed of ultimate minimal 
particles, in accordance with Lucretius, who was after all a major 
source of his inspiration. To be sure, it would be a mistake to iden­
tify the minute particles mentioned in the Sylva sylvarum and other 
late works with atoms; but the fact that Bacon postulated them as 
the last epistemologically accessible units does not necessarily imply 
that he denied the existence of even smaller atomic units. Indeed, 
the fact that in the Cogitationes, the atomist hypothesis is allowed to 
coexist with explanations based on particles of a higher level is a sign 
that Bacon did not consider his epistemological concern to exclude 
such ultimate ontological assumptions. However, after the Novum  
organum, Bacon no longer appealed directly to atoms in order to 
explain changes and natural actions.
Unfortunately, the textual evidence does not supply us with Ba­
con’s final position on this issue. However, we may imagine the con­
sequences of each possible position. On the assumption that Bacon’s 
epistemological neglect of atoms did not imply their ontological re­
jection, our distinction between principle and origin (cf. fig. i), 
based on the polarity of atoms and forms, would not lose its value. 
In fact, it would retain some hermeneutic utility in shedding light 
on the background of the concept of form in the Novum organum, 
insofar as the concept of primary matter still serves as the material 
basis for the forms. On the other hand, should it have been the case 
that Bacon eventually denied the existence of atoms, then it must be 
concluded that his allegorical account of the principles and origins 
of nature will not work. As a result. Bacon’s ontology in the Novum 
organum could only account for the actual physical world, but could 
no longer give an explanation of its beginnings.
Klein, “Experiment,” pp. 305-306. For the debt of Boyle’s concept of texture 
to Bacon’s schematism, see Clericuzio, “Le trasmutazioni.”
Gemelli, Aspetti, pp. 196-197.
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Irrespective of the correctness of either conjecture, it is evident 
that questions concerning the ultimate material principles of matter 
have no importance in Bacon’s last philosophy, because no causative- 
operational role is assigned to atoms any longer. Atoms, if they exist, 
would be blind and undetermined and would therefore not be able 
to cause the motions of matter. Rather, the origin of these motions 
is to be found in the schematisms.'^*'
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